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NON-COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA ON POLICE EFFECTUALITY
JAMES W. WITT*
Possibly the most significant and pressing
problem currently confronting constitutional
government in the United States is the necessity
to effect a balance between the rights of the in-
dividual and the rights of society. Nowhere is this
problem more obvious than in the conflict sur-
rounding recent applications by the courts of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the criminal accused.
Much of the current debate over the rules pro-
tecting the rights of suspects against self-incrimina-
tion swirls around the controversial Escobedo'
and Miranaa2 decisions. Countless negative al-
legations, regarding the impact of these rulings on
law enforcement and crime in general, have been
circulated by spokesmen both in and out of law
enforcement. Since most of these allegations have
no foundation in fact, this study is designed to
empirically examine the impact that Miranda
has had on the effectiveness of one western police
department. This writer has made an effort to
deal with this topic both from the theoretical
viewpoint of a scholar and the practical viewpoint
of a former police officer. The main conclusion to
be drawn from this study is that the Miranda
decision does not appear to have had a significant
impact upon that effectiveness.
Most of the concern over the Miranda decision
emanates from the belief that the ruling has had
a detrimental impact upon police interrogation
procedures directly and police effectiveness in-
directly. The problem of what constitutes proper
police interrogation practices in a democratic
society is not new.
BACKGROUND
Historically, the revulsion against police in-
terrogation was spawned from the displeasure
caused by judicial inquisition in political cases.3
Interrogation has become a police function for-
* Head, Department of Criminal Justice, Armstrong
State College.
I Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Its History, 15 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1902).
tuitously and it has never been legally sanctioned. 4
However, even without legalization, questioning
has been felt by some authorities to be "an in-
dispensable instrumentality of justice."5 Due to
the increasing Supreme Court supervision over
state police interrogation practices, one of the
most perplexing and contentious questions in
American criminal procedure has evolved-should
law enforcement authorities be permitted to
utilize post-arrest questioning?
The arguments championing the elimination of,
or the placing of vigorous restraints upon, post-
arrest questioning seem to rest upon several in-
terrelated premises. Some writers hold the guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights to be more important
than any reduction of police efficiency caused by
restrictions on police interrogation. 6 Other writers
examine the psychological aspects of post-arrest
questioning and conclude that the safeguards
provided by recent Supreme Court decisions are
almost futile.? These writers appear to be making
a case for the complete elimination of post-arrest
questioning. However, one writer finds the psy-
chological aspects of incommunicado interrogation
to be less damaging to one's mental health than
the stresses of everyday life.8 A few authorities
expound the virtues of the modern scientific tech-
iques for detection, which they feel should
preclude the need for any questioning in many
4 MAYERS, STsAT Wx AENwN THE Firm AmEND-
mENT? 87 (1959).
5 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).6 See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Per-
sons: A Skeptical View, 51 J. Cami. L. C. & P.S. 37
(1961). See also Kamisar, What Is An "Involuntary"
Confession?, 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 732 (1963); Pye,
The Supreme Court and the Police: Fact and Fiction, 57
J. Cm. L. C. & P.S. 405 (1966); Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAav. L. REv. 26
(1956); Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation
of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the
States, 44 B.U.L. REv. 425 (1964).7 See, e.g., Driver, Confessions and the Social Psy-
chology of Coercion, 82 HA.tv. L. REv. 59 (1968); Roth-
blatt & Piter, Police Interrogation: Warnings and
Waiver-Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 NoTRE DAsix
LAW. 494 (1967).
8 Marx, Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions, 57
Dimo. L. REv. 1 (1952).
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cases.9 Seemingly their rationale is that, in most
cases, the utilization of modem investigative
techniques should cause the arrest to take place,
only after the investigation produces sufficient
evidence to sustain it. Finally, others recognize
that police interrogation is an established practice
but they perceive its dangers. This group advocates
that interrogation be used under controlled con-
ditions' 0
Support for those advocating the necessity of
post-arrest questioning can be found in pre-
Miranda decisions relative to confessions u in the
argument that it serves as a means for innocent
suspects to clear themselves,"2 and in its utility for
averting a breakdown of the trial court system."3
Generally, the most prevalent justification for
this position rests in the contention that it is
necessary for effective law enforcement in modem
urban life.' 4 This position, which is rooted in the
concept of police efficiency and the general social
utility of post-arrest questioning, claims many
adherentS15 as well as critics.' 6
'See, e.g., Hughes, Confessions and Their Uncer-
tainty, 14 LoYorLA L. REv. 173 (1967-1968); Mueller,
The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations, 52 J. Cam. L. C. & P.S. 2 (1961).
10 See Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused
or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRas. L. & C. 1017 (1934)
where the author advocated questioning in the presence
of counsel before a magistrate as a solution to the ex-
cesses of post-arrest questioning. It is interesting to
note that Pound, too, was writing at a time when "law
and order" was a major issue in the United States.
Realizing the futility of trying to fortify the rights of
criminals during this period, Pound's solution was to
eliminate the justification for illegal interrogation, i.e.,
to preserve law and order by substituting a procedure
that offered safeguards for the accused.
" See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441(1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
"See Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales
for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CaRs. L. C. &
P.S. 459 (1965).
"1 Barrett brings out this point in Police Practices and
the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAsaj.
L. Rav. 45 (1952).
"See, e.g., Inbau, Police Interrogatim-A Practical
Necessity, 52 J. Cans. L. C. & P.S. 16 (1961) as an
illustration of the most prolific proponent of this argu-
ment.
"6 Some who have taken this position include Bator &
Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right
to Counsel, 66 COLum. L. REv. 62 (1966); Craig, To
Police the Judges-Not Just Judge the Police, 57 J.
CR.m L. C. & P.S. 305 (1966); Kuh, The "Rest of Us"
in the "Policing the Police" Controversy, 57 J. Cans. L.,
C. & P.S. 244 (1966); Thompson, The Supreme Court
and the Police: 1968, 57 J. CRm. L. C. & P.S. 419
(1966); Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations under Foreign Law: England, 52 J. Cans.
L. C. & P.S. 50 (1961).
16 See, e.g., Craig, Criminal Interrogation and Con-
fessions: The Ethical Imperative, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 173
In contrast to the antagonists of post-arrest
interrogation, the protagonists seem to reason
that a stable and safe society is dependent upon
an efficient police department. Therefore, some
sacrifices of individual rights and liberties must
be made in order to achieve this end. Also inter-
twined with this rationale is the assumpti6n that
"men with honest motives and purposes do not
remain silent when their honor is assailed."' 7
To all appearances, most of the above arguments
fail to surpass the narrow bounds of emotion.
Therefore, it is imperative that such an important
issue be subjected to empirical analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Upon examining the literature during the initial
phase of this study, the author found that very
little reliable data were available regarding the
behavior and attitudes of law enforcement officers
or their interrogation procedures. There are no
dissertations dealing with the topic. Since 1965,
there have been several published studies, of
varying degrees of sophistication, analyzing the
effects of either the Escobedo or Miranda decisions
on law enforcement;s however, most of these
studies are preoccupied with the impact of these
decisions on obtaining confessions, rather than
the interrogation process 9 From those studies
dealing with police interrogation procedures, the
(1968); Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Court, 49 CoRNr L. Q. 436(1964).
7 U. S. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th
Cir. 1926).
"8 See, e.g., N. SOBEL, TE NEW CoNFEssIoN STAN-
DARns 140-151 (1966); a statistical study dealing with
the impact of the Escobedo decision upon the confession
rate of the Detroit Police Department in Souris, Stop
and Frisk or Arrest and Search-the Use and Misuse of
Euphemisms, 57 J. Cams. L. C. & P.S. 263-64 (1966);
Younger, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some
Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FopanAif L. REv.
255 (1966). See also Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, Cus-
todial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MzcH. L. REv. 1347
(1968); Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and
Attitndes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by Pre-
and Post-Miranda Questionnaires, 1968 DuxE L..
425 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pitts-
burgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1
(1967); Comment, Interrogation and the Criminal
Process, 374 ANNALS 47 (1967); Comment, Interroga-
tion in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L. J. 1641 (1967).
9 The New Haven Study and the studies by Robin-
son and that of Medalie, Zetiz and Alexander are those
dealing in some respect with the impact of court de-




author.was able to avail himself of a pre-tested
questionnaire. and some tried methods of analysis.
In order to test for police effectiveness, it was
necessary to tap information contained in police
files. Normally, this source is unavailable to social
scientists; however, being a former police officer
the writer was able to gain access to the files of a
West Coast police department. The Chief of the
department in question, a former supervisor of
the writer, was gracious enough to open his de-
partment's files to the author. However, he re-
quested that the department not be identified in
the study, hence the pseudonym "Seaside City."
Seaside City, California, is an eight-square-mile
enclave in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, with
a population of 83,249 at the time this study was
effected.20 Only 6.2 per cent of the population is
nonwhite,R and the median income is $6,845 per
year.n2 Educationally, the residents average 12.3
years of completed school work and 57.3 per cent
finished high school.2
Although principally a residential community,
a major aircraft manufacturing facility and nu-
merous small manufacturing firms and subcon-
tracting firms are located within its city limits.
The University of California at Los Angeles is
situated near enough to make Seaside City an
attractive place for many academicians to reside.
A large urban renewal program has been instru-
mental in clearing away some of the worst slums
in the beach area of Seaside City. These slums
have been replaced by luxury high rise apart-
ments.
Since Seaside City is a semitropical beach city
located within a major metropolitan area, law
enforcement is a complex business. Nearly 12
million people visit its beach recreation areas
every year, and its location makes it an attractive
place for social undesirables to congregate. Con-
sequently, there has been a steady rise in Seaside
City's "Crime Index" 21 over the past five years-
20 1 UNTE= STATEs BUREAU or TirE CENsus, UNITED
STATEs CENsus or PopuLAn-oN: 1960 1-72 (1963),
passim.
2. Id. at 1-184.
' Id. at 1-341.
2Id. at 1-337. All of the above figures are higher
than the national median for cities in the same category
as Seaside City.
24 See Seaside City's ANmuAL REPoRT-1967-68, 6(1968).
21 Seven. crimes-murder, forcible rape, robbery, ag-
gravated assault, burglary, larceny ($50.00 and over
in value) and auto theft-are used by the FBI as an
index to measure crime. See CRIME iN =H UNTED
STATEs,'UNIFOR CRIu REPORTS 4 (1969).
a rise that has kept it in the upper five per cent of
the cities of comparable size.
Due to the geographic location of Seaside City,
the make-up of its residents, and the fine quality
of police employed by the city, its crime patterns
will not resemble those of other cities of com-
parable size; therefore, one should be very cautious
about drawing generalizations from this study
and applying them to cities of comparable size.
Tnn DEPARTMENT
At the time of this study, there were 128 police
officers in Seaside City, exclusive of 39 civilian
employees. These men were organized into three
divisions-investigation, uniform and staff services.
Twenty-five of the officers were assigned to the
detective bureau and three to the vice squad. The
department was under the supervision of a chief,
who could be categorized as a progressive "old-
timer."
Although the department's salaries and benefits
were higher than the national average for munic-
ipal police officers, the department experienced a
high rate of personnel turnover. This was probably
due to the attractive opportunities available in
private industry in Southern California. In order
to offset this situation, the department had in-
stituted a 'Tolice Cadet" program0 and a heli-
copter patrol.
Since this study is basic in nature,, no attempt
will be made to test precise assumptions. Only
tests of general assumptions will be made. The
assumptions to be tested are, on the one hand,
that the Miranda decision has hindered police
effectiveness, and, on the other, that it has not.
From numerous casual discussions with law en-
forcement officers, materials from* other studies,
and the media, it was ascertained that police
officers felt that the Miranda decision was
adversely affecting them in five areas: (1) in the
outcome of formal interrogation, (2) in the col-
lateral functions of interrogation, (3) in the amount
of stolen property recovered, (4) in their con-
viction rate, and (5) in their clearance rate. There-
fore, these five assumptions will be tested as a
measure of police effectiveness. Before testing
these assumptions, an attempt will be made to
ascertain the police's evaluation of the importance
28 Under this program, college students, 18-25 years
of age, are paid to work under the supervision of veteran
officers at a multiplicity of assignments. When the
cadet reaches the age of 21 and/or has enough college
credits, he can qualify to become a regular police officer.
[Vol. 64
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of interrogation and determine the need for in-
terrogation.
In order to test these former suppositions, data
were obtained from the ifies of the Seaside City
Police Department. Due to limited time and
resources, only cases dealing with murder, forcible
rape, robbery27 and burglary were utilized in this
study. It would have been desirable to have used
data predating 1964, but all files prior to that
data were unavailable. The area of inquiry was
further narrowed by using only those cases in
which suspects were actually arrested and in-
carcerated by the Seaside City Police Depart-
ment. This eliminated all cases in which suspects
were detained for questioning but never incar-
cerated. As the result of this elimination process,
478 cases remained to comprise the sample. Each
of these cases was read and analyzed by the author
who, in many cases, used analytical methods
gleaned from the New Haven Study."
The author fully recognizes the problems in-
volved in trying to prove a causal relationship
between Miranda and the various assumptions
to be tested; however, this does not preclude the
establishment of trends. This study differs from
those cited above in that more assumptions are
tested and, whenever possible, comparisons are
made with other studies. The general working
hypothesis of this study was that police effective-
ness was being impaired by the Miranda decision.
It was further anticipated that a high degree of
negative impact would be found when each of the
above assumptions were tested.
Th SEsmE CITY STDY
In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions
limiting police interrogation came utterances by
scholars, 9 police officials and prosecutors" and
jurists" portending a foreboding future for law
enforcement. Most of these observers discerned
a correlation between police interrogation and
effective law enforcement. Sparse reliable in-
27 This does not include cases of strong-arm robberies
where one juvenile robbed another.
2See Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18.
29 See Inbau, supra note 14.
30See, e.g., the N. Y. Times, August 22, 1964, at 23,
col. 5; N. Y. Times, May 14, 1965, at 39, col. 1; N. Y.
Times, September 10, 1965, at 1, col. 1; N. Y. Times,
November 27, 1965, at 1, col. 1; N. Y. Times, January
24, 1966, at 35, col. 1; N. Y. Times, July 23, 1966, at
54, col. 5; N. Y. Times, August 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2.
"tSee, e.g., critical remarks made by an appellate
court judge in N. Y. Times, August 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2;
English, Lawyers in the Station House? 57 J. Cgnr. L.
C. & P.S. 283 (1966).
formation was offered by any of these critics to
support their grim premonitions.
In order to ascertain the degree of importance
placed upon interrogation by investigative per-
sonnel in the Los Angeles area,2 forty-three de-
tectives were asked to respond to the following
question: "Are there ways in which investigation
could possibly replace interrogation as a means
for crime solution?"" The responses to the ques-
tion, which is similar to the one responded to in
the New Haven Study, compare favorably with
those obtained by the New Haven interviewers,
even though differences in approach make it
difficult to compare the data in the immediate
undertaking with those of other germane studies.
In the New Haven Study 71 per cent of a sam-
ple of 21 detectives felt that interrogation was
indispensable, 19 per cent thought that it was
not absolutely necessary for effective law enforce-
ment, but it would be too costly to replace, and
10 per cent felt that the elimination of interrogation
would not impede their work. 4
Therefore, when asked abstractly, the results
indicate that the respondents in the immediate
study perceived interrogation to be necessary for
effective law enforcement.5
THE CoRRELATIoN BETwEEN INTERROGATION
N Rm SOLUTION
In order to collate surety with reality, i.e.,
determine whether interrogation is essential to
1" Only veteran detectives, who had been same prior
to the Escobedo decision in 1964, were utilized in this
portion of the study in order to secure a more valid
perspective of the problem.
"Since the Seaside City Police Department did not
have an adequate number of personnel that could
qualify as respondents, detectives froi the Los An-
geles Police Department and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department were utilized in this portion of
the study. This does not seem to present a methodo-
logical problem because of the following: (a) the de-
partments have adjacent jurisdictions that overlap in
some instances, .(b) the crime problem is the same in
the three jurisdictions, i.e., major metropolitan crime,(c) the caliber of personnel appears to be the same, and(d) these personnel are equally well trained.
"'The respondents in both studies perceiving an ab-
solute need for interrogation differed in their reasons.
In the New Haven Study 54 per cent thought interroga-
tion was necessary due to the lack of evidence in many
cases and 46 per cent saw its need resting in its com-
plemental effects. See New Haven Study, supra note
18, at 1592, note 195. Cf. Table 1.
35 It should be noted that during the interviews none
of the respondents criticized the courts for excluding
involuntary confessions. Their primary concerns were
that legal interrogation procedures were being emascu-
lated and that interrogation might be completely elimi-










No alternate methods could substitute for 28 65
interrogation
1. Interrogation compliments other in- 20 72
vestigative methods and there can be
no substitutions
2. In many cases evidence does not exist 8 28
Interrogation not absolutely necessary but 12 28
other means are too costly in terms of
time and resources
Interrogation could be eliminated without 3 7




N = 478 Cases
No. %
Interrogation essential 75 16
Interrogation important 38 8
Interrogation not important 40 8
Interrogation unnecessary 325 68
478 100
the solution of most crimes, an examination was
made of 478 fies from the Seaside City Police
Department. Each of the 478 cases was read and
analyzed by the author, who, in most cases, utilized
analytical methods gleaned from the New Haven
Study.3
8
Using the "Evidence-Investigation Scale" set
forth in the New Haven Study,37 a judgment
was made regarding the amount of evidence avail-
able in each case for a conviction. Admittedly,
the danger involved when a researcher attempts
to assume the role of judge and jury is immense.
However, judgment in this instance was fortified
by the researcher's seven years of police experi-
ence and his numerous years of studying the law
11 See Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18.
17 Id. at 1582-1588.
and the court system. On the basis of these data,
the need for interrogation was categorized as
being "essential", "important", "not important",
or "unnecessary"P. The number of "essential"
and "important" interrogations should be one
indicator of the importance of interrogation to
the solution of the specific crime for which the
suspect is accused. It should be recognized that
interrogation has other uses than merely solving
crimes. These uses will be examined later.
Table 2 indicates that interrogation was found
to be "necessary", i.e., "essential" or "important",
in only 24 per cent of the cases reviewed. Generally,
the figures in Table 2 compare favorably with
those in the New Haven Study, where interroga-
tion was deemed "necessary" in only 13 per cent
of the cases, "not important" in 9 per cent, and
"unnecessary" in 77 per cent of all cases.3 9
After taking into account the possible bias
involved in gathering the data, it appears that in
most cases interrogation was not needed to solve
the immediate crimes for which the suspects were
accused. 0 Hence, if the respondents were referring
to crime in general when they equated the necessity
n Interrogation was deemed "essential" if there ap-
peared to be no physical evidence, witnesses or other
investigative substitutes; "important" if there were
some small leads, but very little other evidence; "not
important" if a sizable amount of evidence existed for
conviction or little difficulty was foreseen in securing
same; and "unnecessary" if the evidence seemed to
exist overwhelmingly against the suspect. See the New
Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1583-1584.
3 Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1585.
The 11 per cent difference in the finding relative to the
"necessity" to interrogate may be due to the writer's
bias, when analyzing his data. Due to the court's cur-
rent preoccupation with the accused's civil rights and
the difficulties involved in predicting the amount of
evidence needed for conviction, there probably was a
tendency by the writer to overestimate the amount of
evidence needed for conviction in some cases. In a field
patrol setting, the results of the President's Crime Com-
mission Study revealed that in all of the 30 felony ar-
rests observed, there was enough evidence for arrest
without the need for field interrogation. Reiss and
Black supra note 18, at 56. In an examination of 47
murder, burglary and robbery cases, Sobel found that
confessions secured through interrogation were "essen-
tial" or "helpful" in only 21 per cent of the cases. See
Sobel, supra note 18, at 146.4
0 Any comparisons drawn between the findings in
the New Haven Study and the immediate study must
be guarded, due to the quality of the personnel inter-
viewed and the crime problem in each jurisdiction.
Based upon the New Haven Study's observations as
compared with the writer's, the Seaside City personnel
would appear to be more professionalized. Also, the
New Haven police are not confronted with the same
crime problems as those encountered by departments




OuTcoME OF FORMAL INTERROGATION (MtfURDER, FORCIBLE RPE, ROBBERY, BURGLARY)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Pre- Post-
(N= 105) (N - 80) (N = 69) (N = 104) (N =120) (iranda Mirnda
Outcome (N 224) (N 254)
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Suspect not questioned 1 1 3 4 1 1 19 16 4 2 20 8
Suspect refused to talk 6 6 5 6 3 7 10 10 10 8 14 6 22 9
Interrogation unproductive 27 26 18 23 7 10 19 18 19 16 49 22 41 16
Signed confession 7 7 6 8 4 6 1 1 2 2 17 8 3 1
Oral admission of guilt 40 38 38 48 38 55 43 41 42 35 96 43 105 41
Signed statement 3 3 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 1
Oral incriminating evidence 19 18 8 10 10 15 30 29 26 22 33 15 60 24
Insufficient data 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
Interrogation productive but form 1 1 2 3 1 1 4 2
unknown
105 101* 80 101* 69 99* 104 100 120 101* 224 101* 254 101*
% cases questioning unsuccessful 67 70 77 71 61 69 67
* Percentages might not total 100 due to rounding.
to interrogate with the solution of crimes, their
assumptions are not supported by the above data.
OuTcom oF FORMAL INTERROGATION
The respondents were in almost complete agree-
ment over the effect that the Miranda warnings
were having on the outputs of formal interrogation.
Most believed that they were getting many fewer
confessions, admissions and statements. Hence,
one could assume that since the police have been
required to fulfill the Miranda requirements, there
has been a considerable decrease in the quantity of
confessions, admissions and statements being ob-
tained by law enforcement officers.
In order to test this assumption, a comparison
was made between the various outputs of formal
interrogation prior to the Seaside City Police
Department's compliance with the Miranda
dictum and the outputs subsequent to the com-
pliance. For the purposes of this comparison, July
1, 1966 was the date when the Seaside City de-
tectives began to observe the Miranda precepts.4
11 In January of 1965, a ruling by the California
Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Dorado, 398
P.2d 361 (1965), expanded the scope of the Esco-
bedo decision in California. Dorado required the police
to advise a suspect of his right to counsel before inter-
rogating him. Even though the California police were
restrained more than police in other jurisdictions by
this ruling, most officers agreed that their chances for
useful interrogation were not significantly impaired by
Dorado. Since the respondent's principal complaints
were directed toward Miranda, the date when it took
effect was used for this comparison.
The figures in Table 312 reveal that questioning
was successful" in 69 per cent of the cases before
complying with the Miranda requirements, and
in 67 per cent of the cases after compliance. There
was a drop of 7 per cent in the number of signed
confessions after compliance, but this figure is
inconclusive due to procedures followed by the
Seaside City detectives."
Another comparison of some consequence can
be made between the pre-Miranda year of 1964
and the post-Miranda year of 1967-years in which
the arrest rate was almost the same. In 1964, 67
per cent of the interrogations were successful, as
compared with 71 per cent in 1967. Furthermore,
the police were able to secure oral admissions of
41 Table 3 is a modified version of a table used in the
New Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1589, n. 184.
4"Successful" as used in this context means that
the police were able to get a signed confession, an oral
admission of guilt, a signed incriminating statement or
some type of oral incriminating evidence or other useful
material for conviction through interrogation.
44 From the files, it was impossible to make any de-
termination regarding Miranda's impact on the Seaside
City police's ability to secure signed statements or
confessions. This material was not appended to the re-
ports. Although it is the department's policy to secure a
signed statement whenever possible, the reports did not
reflect that this policy was being followed. From con-
versations with the detectives, it was obvious that since
Miranda and the court's preoccupation with procedural
matters, they do not want to question suspects in cases
where they have enough evidence to convict without
interrogation. The human factor is probably involved




,OuTcoME or FoExAL INTERROGATION (MunDER, FoRcIBLE RAPE, ROBBERY, BURGLARY)
Outcome
Suspect not questioned
Suspect refused to talk
Interrogation unproductive
Signed confession




Interrogation productive but form unknown
% cases questioning successful
guilt in only 38 per cent of the cases before com-
plying with Miranda, but were able to get the
same evidence in 41 per cent of the cases after
compliance. It should also be noted that prior to
compliance with the Miranda precepts, 18 per
cent of the suspects interrogated incriminated
themselves. However, after compliance, 29 per
cent performed the same act.
A Comparison of the percentage of cases, in
which interrogation was successful by years,
reveals that the percentage had dropped 16 per
cent since the peak year of 1966-from 77 per
cent in 1966 to 61 per cent in 1968 5 However, one
would be hard pressed to try to attribute this
decline to Miranda because, as the figures in Table
3 indicate, there were no attempts made to in-
terrogate 16 per cent of the suspects in 1968. One
would seem to be on firmer ground in holding
that Miranda had an indirect effect on successful
interrogation.
Table 3 also reveals that more suspects were
refusing to talk to the police. Again, this could be
due to Miranda; however, due to the small per-
centage of increase in this figure, it would seem
that there could be a more plausible answer. This
increase may simply be the result of enlarged
publicity via the mass media or verbally from
4 1 It is noteworthy that from January through June,
1966, i.e., before the Miranda requirements took effect,
the police were successful in 74 per cent of their inter-
rogations. However, after initiating their warning pro-
cedure in July, they were successful in 80 per cent of
their interrogations for the remainder of the year.
1966



















confidants and others through which suspects have
been made more aware of their rights.
Generally speaking, the above assumption does
not seem to be supported by the data. There is
little indication from the above data that the
Miranda requirements have materially affected
the outcome of formal police interrogation in
Seaside City. Although different approaches were
used, the findings of some of the other interrogation
studies lend support to this conclusion. 6
COLLATERAL FUNcTIONS OF INTERROGATION
When responding to the question, "In what
ways besides getting evidence for trial is the in-
formation from interrogation used?" the inter-
viewees cites several collateral functions per-
formed by the interrogation process.a Most re-
spondents were quick to point out that the per-
formance of these functions had been considerably
impeded by the Miranda decision. Hence, the
assumption that interrogation provides the means
46 After Escobedo, the Detroit Study recorded a mere
2.8 per cent drop in the confession rate. Souris, s=pra
note 18, at 1573. The New Haven Study registered a
"10 to 15 per cent" decline in the number of suspects
giving incriminating evidence, supra note 18, at 1573.
However, the New Haven researchers attributed this
decline to factors other than Miranda. Id. at 1563. The
Pittsburgh Study discovered a 16.9 per cent drop in the
confession rate subsequent to Miranda and attributed
this decline largely to Mirandae Seeburger and Wettick,
supra note 18, at 11.47 Table 4 is a slightly modified version of its counter-
part in the New Haven Study. Interrogation in Newa
Haven, supra note 18, at 1593 n. 197.
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by which several important collateral functions
needed for effective law enforcement are fulfilled.
Since the Miranda decision, these functions have
been seriously curtailed in Seaside City.
In looking at Table 5, one perceives that the
police were able to obtain additional information
in four important areas as the result of interroga-
tion. In a five-year span, the police were able to
implicate accomplices in 12 per cent of the in-
terrogations18 solve other crimes in 18 per cent
4 9
recover stolen property in 10 per cent, and help
suspects clear themselves in 15 per cent of the
cases50  where post-custodial questioning was
utilized.
The interesting figures in Table 5 are those
depicting the decline in the percentage rate of the
instances in which the police were getting collateral
results from interrogation. This decline is accom-
panied by a parallel increase in the percentage of
cases in which no collateral results were being ob-
tained. The reasons listed above for the decline in
the rate of successful cases of interrogation might
well apply here, but it might well be the case that
Miranda has had an adverse impact on these
figures. For example, the Seaside City detectives
did not significantly curtail their efforts to in-
terrogate suspects until 1968.5 Yet, as Table 5
indicates, in the year following Miranda there
was a 2 per cent drop in instances of accomplice
implication, a 10 per cent decrease in the crime
clearance figures, and a 3 per cent decline in cases
where stolen property was recovered through
interrogation. Prior to Miranda, there had been a
steady increase in these figures.
Table 5 reveals that interrogation has furnished
some important collateral benefits for law en-
forcement in Seaside City and that there has been
a diminution of these benefits since the Miranda
decision. Therefore, it would appear that the above
48 The results of the New Haven Study indicate that
interrogation helped the New Haven police to identify
or implicate accomplices in 27 out of 90 cases, or 30 per
cent of the time; however, they downgrade these results.
Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1593-94.
49 The New Haven researchers found that interroga-
tion was instrumental in clearing 12 unsolved crimes or
"... 10 to 15% of all crimes investigated..." during
their study. Id. at 1595 n.203. The clearance rate varia-
ble is one that is open to serious questions as to its
utility. This will be discussed further, when the clear-
ance rate of the Seaside City police is analyzed.
50 This figure coincides with the numerous incidents,
related by the respondents, of suspects refusing to talk
due to legal advice not to do so, or befuddlement as the
result of being issued the Miranda warnings.51See Table 3 supra.
TABLE 4







Implicate accomplices 25 14
Solve other crimes 24 16
Recover stolen goods 23 9
Understand criminal motivation 2 8
General criminal intelligence 26 6
Eliminate narcotics sources 5 5
Remove weapons from circulation 1 3
Plea-bargaining 2
Help suspects clear selves 7 2
Detour suspects into other processes 2
Personal satisfaction 2
Public relations 1 1
Lecture youths and first offenders 1
Make good informant out of suspect 2
Be able to personally help the suspect by 3
knowing him better
* The numbers are not mutually exclusive.
assumption has received some corroboration from
the data.
EFFECT OF THE MIRANDA DECISION ON THE PER-
CENTAGE OF STOLEN PROPERTY REcovERD
Another problem of grave concern for the re-
spondents was what they perceived to be a decline
in their recovery rate of stolen property. They
attributed this decline to Miranda because of the
restrictions it imposes upon their talking to sus-
pects. In contrast to the New -Haven Study where
only 9 per cent of the respondents felt that re-
covering stolen property was a reason for in-
terrogation, 23 per cent of the respondents in the
Seaside City Study held this view. 2 From this
information it is possible to assume that, due to
the restraints imposed upon the interrogation
procedures by the Miranda requirements, the
police are recovering less stolen property.
From the figures in Table 6 it would appear
that if questioning suspects is a major criterion for
recovering stolen property, Miranda is having
little, if any, impact on the Seaside City police.
Over a ten-year period, the Seaside City police




ExTRA RESULTS FROM INTERROGATION (N = 478 CASES)
Pre- Post-
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Average Miranda Miranda
(N=105) (N=80) (N=69) (N104) (N= 120) (N224) n =254)Results(N=24(N=5)
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % % % %
Implicate accomplices 10 10 10 13 10 15 14 13 12 10 12 12.3 11.6
Solve other crimes 16 15 20 25 18 26 17 16 15 13 18 22.3 14.3
Recover stolen property 8 8 10 13 11 16 13 13 5 4 10 11.9 8.0
Help suspect clear self 26 25 7 9 2 3 26 25 8 7 15 14.3 15.0
Nil 54 51 44 55 36 52 52 50 89 74 58 54.9 62.9
NOTE: Numbers and percentages are not mutually exclusive.
TABLE 6
PROPERTY-STOLEN AND RECOVERED
1960 1961 j 1962 1963 1964
Property stolen*
Property recovered























* Stolen autos are not included in the above figures.
NOTE: Average rate of recovery for the above period = 10.6 per cent per year.
recovered an average of 10.6 per cent of their
stolen property each year. In the pre-Miranda
years, they recovered 10.7 per cent of their stolen
property. In the three post-Miranda years, they
recovered the same amount-10.7 per cent. If the
15 per cent recovery rate in 1969 is not an aberra-
tion, an argument could be made that Miranda
has helped the recovery rate by requiring more
stringent investigation. This argument could gain
some support from the figures in Table 5 that
indicate a sharp decrease in the amount of stolen
property recovered through interrogation.
Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the
above data, the results do not seem to be con-
sistent with the assumption.
CONVICTION RATE
The number of accused convicted at the trial
stage would seem to afford another indicator of
the impact of Miranda upon law enforcement
effectiveness. The respondents continuously cited
instances to the interviewer in which cases were
dismissed at the trial level due to some legal tech-
nicality. Many of these technicalities, according
to the respondents, had their roots in the Miranda
requirements. They also felt that limitations on
the interrogation procedures were keeping them
from building stronger cases at a time when they
were greatly needed. Therefore, one could assume
that procedural technicalities, emanating from
Miranda and Miranda's impact upon the police's
efforts to build strong cases through interrogation,
have resulted in a decrease in the conviction
rate.
Table 7 contains the figures for all felony con-
victions in Seaside City for a nine-year period as
taken from the Department's annual reports.
Since the data regarding convictions were not
available in any other form, the total conviction
rate for these periods will be used for the purpose
of this study. Hence, the specific cases used in this





Guilty of a Acquitted or i of Cases in % of Cases inSOtherwise Wch Defendant Which DefendantDismissed Found Guilty [Gulty o aLesser Offense
1961 115 67 12 94 36
1962 65 80 17 90 53
1963 67 61 9 93 48
1964 31 91 14 90 50
1965 30 70 12 89 70
1966 40 64 6 95 62
1967 48 80 20 87 54
1968 38 65 20 84 63
1969 28 60 25 78 68
Pre-Miranda
(1961-66)
Totals 348 423 70 92 55
Post-Miranda
Totals 114 205 65 83 64
Table 7, there was a 9 per cent drop in the con-
viction rate-from 92 per cent of 841 cases in the
pre-Miranda years to 83 per cent of 384 cases in
the pQst-Miranda period. Other figures reveal that
64 per cent of the 83 per cent of those found guilty
in the post-Miranda period were found guilty of
lesser offenses. This is in contrast to the 55 per
cent in the pre-Miranda period.D
In testing the above assumption, the figures
contained in Table 8- reveal that in most of the
478 cases examined in this study, there was very
strong evidence against the accused when he went
to trial. When this fact is added to the remarks
made by many of the interviewees chiding the
district attorney's office for prosecuting only
"sure" cases, the above assumption appears to be
somewhat doubtful. 55
The above facts in conjunction with the data
from Table 2, showing that interrogation was
" The Pittsburgh Study reported a decline of .4 per
cent in the conviction rate in the post-Miranda period
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. See Seeburger &
Wettick, supra note 18, at 19.
" The format for this table was taken from Inter-
rogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1580.
61 The fact that District Attorney Younger is in-
formed in the matter can be seen in a comment from
his study. Upon acknowledging that his office's con-
viction rate had dropped 10.2 per cent due to the ex-
clusion of several confessions with consequential ac-
quittals, Mr. Younger remarked, "Since each of these
22 cases was filed prior to Miranda, we can anticipate
that this same problem will not occur when cases filed
after Miranda reach the superior court." See Younger,
supra note 18, at 38-39.
TABLE 8




Complainant as witness 34 57
Eyewitness 22 25
Expert 18 25
Alleged confession or admission 43 19
Family and friends of complainant 5 18
Accomplice-turned state's evidence 5 9
Other witnesses 20 7
NOTE: Percentages indicate the per cent of cases
each source of evidence was utilized. Since each case
might contain several sources, the percentages will not
total 100.
necessary in only 24 per cent of the cases handled
by the Seaside City police, would indicate that
only strong cases reached the trial stage. With the
outcome of the case at the trial level being de-
pendent upon such imponderables as attorneys'
acumen, judges' attitudes, jury capriciousness
and witness availability, it would be difficult to
attribute a drop in the conviction to a specific
court decision or, for that matter, court decisions
generally.
Table 7 also reveals that 9 per cent more accused
have been convicted of lesser offenses in the post-





Murder Rape Robbery Burglary Totals
,, 0.0 50 21-0
1960 5 4 80 6 3 50 78 42 54 826 110 13 905 159 18
1961 1 1 100 11 6 55 136 47 35 866 304 35 1014 358 35
1962 5 4 80 20 12 60 127 39 31 992 225 23 1144 280 24
1963 5 5 100 19 10 53 117 37 32 971 176 18 1112 228 21
1964 6 5 83 26 13 50 149 38 26 1102 129 12 1283 185 14
1965 7 7 100 12 6 50 150 58 39 1207 223 18 1376 294 21
1966 1 1 100 11 0 0 154 48 31 1086 133 12 1252 182 15
1967 3 3 100 31 16 52 169 27 16 1419 250 18 1622 296 18
1968 7 5 71 54 14 27 254 46 18 1698 253 15 2011 318 16
1969 4 4 100 66 30 46 229 37 16 1736 232 13 2035 303 15
1960-66
Total 30 27 90 105 50 48 911 309 34 7850 1300 17 8896 1686 19
1967-69
Total 14 12 86 149 60 40 652 110 17 4853 735 15 5668 917 16
researcher, it was not possible to ascertain to what
extent this figure was affected by Mirazda. How-
ever, allowing that the Miranda requirements
could possibly contribute to this increase, there
would seem to be two more plausible explanations
for this situation. First, there could be a sub-
stantial degree of plea bargaining56 being practiced
by the prosecutors. This could result from incom-
petent or overtaxed prosecutors or by the simple
fact that the court system itself is too strained to
handle the cases.
Second, the prosecutor's office might have the
tendency to reduce charges in cases where the
conviction of a felony could involve grave addi-
tional problems for the accused, to circumvent a
mandatory minimum sentence, or to avoid a
community obloquy that could be affixed to an
accused convicted of certain offenses.
To test this assumption adequately, one would
have to examine each case in which an accused
was found not guilty or guilty of a lesser offense
and tabulate the reasons for these results. Since
these data were not available, the evidence for
the above assumption would have to be deemed
inconclusive.
5 6 This refers to the procedure whereby the prosecutor
and defense counsel will negotiate an agreement by
which the accused pleads guilty either of a lesser charge
or for a more desirable sentence recommendation by
the prosecutor.
THE CrLARrcE RATE57
Again, most of the respondents were quick to
refer to a decline in their clearance rate when
discussing problems emanating from the Miranda
decision. Other police officials have expressed the
same concern,51 and justification for these ap-
prehensions can be found in the UNuoni CRiME
REPORTS. In the years 1960-1968 the Crime Index
rose 122 per cent, but the Clearance Rate declined
to -32 per cent.59 Hence, one could assume that
the clearance rate is adversely affected by court
decisions which limit the police's ability to question
suspects about crimes--crimes which they might
have committed other than the one for which
they are charged.
Table 9 sets forth the complete figures for the
clearance rates of the crimes dealt with in this
study over a ten-year period of time. These data
were obtained from the annual reports of the
7 This refers to ".... the percentage of crimes known
to the police which the police believe have been
'solved'." See SKoLNicx, JusTicE WITHoUT TRIAl 168
(1966). It is one of the means used by the police to
measure their effectiveness.0' The Deputy Commissioner for Community Rela-
tions of the New York City Police Department at-
tributed a 10 per cent decline in their clearance rate to
Supreme Court decisions in the N. Y. Times, February
21, 1967, at 36, col. 3.
59See CR 11-1 THE UNITED STATES: UNMORM
Cani Rx rTs, 32 (1968). During this period the
population rose 11 per cent.
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Seaside City Police Department and were avail-
able in no other form. The cases utilized in the
present undertaking are included in these totals.
As the figures in Table 960 indicate, the clearance
rate for the Seaside City police did drop 3 per
cent in the post-Miranda period. Furthermore,
the chart shows that the decline has affected all
four categories of crimes used for this analysis."
However, the decline did not begin in the 1966
Miranda year; in fact, the clearance rate actually
rose 3 per cent in the first year following Miranda
with subsequent decreases. If Miranda did have
an adverse effect on the clearance rate, it is reason-
able to assume that it would be reflected in the
1967 figures. Since this was not the case, it would
be hard to assume that arevival of the pre-Miranda
interrogation procedures would rally the clearance
rate.
It would seem that any decline in the clearance
rate could not be totally attributed to Miranda.
Factors such as increased police workloads without
commensurate increases in manpower, increasing
criminal mobility and the plain fact that the
police are interrogating fewer people would have
to be taken into consideration in any valid analysis
of the clearance rate.
Even though crimes can be cleared through
interrogation, many authorities question the use
of the clearance rate as a means to measure law
enforcement efficiency.! In many instances the
suspect will help the police solve other crimes as
a means of mitigating his own circumstances;
therefore, what is accomplished? The case has
usually been lying dormant in the pending file
and the stolen property, if any, is seldom re-
covered.
The data above would appear to lend some
corroboration to the assumption being tested.
The police do clear crimes by questioning people.
Therefore, if the Miranda decision causes the
60 This table is modeled after one used in the Pitts-
burgh Study. See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note
18, at 21.61 In the Pittsburgh Study it was found that the post-
Miranda clearance rate exceeded the pre-Miranda rate
by 1.4 per cent. Id. at 21.
12 For general criticism of dependence upon police
statistics, see Shulman, The Measurement of Crime in
thIe United States, 57 J. CRn. L. C. & P.S. 483 (1966).
For criticism of the clearance rate specifically, see
Foote, Law and Police Practice, 52 Nw. UXL. Rzv. 23-24(1957); Kasimar, On the Tactics of Police Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Court, 49 CoaurnE L.Q. 466-67(1964); Pye, supra note 6, at 412-13; Skolnick, supra
note A at 168-81; Interrogation in New Haven, supra
note 18, at 1596.
police to interrogate fewer people, either through
indolence or fear of losing their principal case on
technicalities, then Miranda does affect the dear-
ance rate. This conclusion must be guarded be-
cause it is possible that the trend in the clearance
rate may change. One could conclude from the
above data, as did Pye in his article,".. .that the
data now available do not support the repeated
assertions that the right to interrogate is a panacea
for a dropping clearance rate."'6
From the results of the Seaside City Study, one
would have to conclude that Miranda's impact
on the effectiveness of law enforcement in that
area has been meager. It is highly improbable
whether any true analysis of Miranda's impact
on law enforcement can be made from data like
that presented above. If Miranda has had an
impact, this would be more likely to show up at
the filing stage" of the legal proceedings and these
data are not available for analysis. Also, and very
importantly, there is no way of determining how
many cases never reach the filing stage due to the
impact of Miranda.
The available studies of this problem, including
the immediate study, are limited both in size and
implication. However, none suggests the thesis
that the confession decisions are fossilizing the
interrogation process. Although the results of this
study do not lend themselves to generalization,
they do seem to suggest reservations about any
unqualified claim that interrogation is valueless.
CONCLUSIONS
The crucial problem of attaining a balance be-
tween individual rights and societal interests lies
at the heart of the controversy over post-arrest
interrogation. The solution to this problem cannot
be found in the Framers' intent or in abstract
theories of individual rights. It must be found in
the context of the times. Normally, in a repre-
sentative democracy, the development of systems
of criminal procedure is the prerogative of the
legislature; however, in the United States, the
judiciary, on occasion, has been charged with
this task. This study was initiated to evaluate the
impact that the handiwork of the judiciary has had
upon the effectiveness of the police.
6 See Pye, supra note 6, at 412.
1
4This is the stage where the police present their case
to the district attorney and he decides whether there is
enough evidence for trial. By being restricted in their
interrogation procedures, the police could be restrained
from building a strong enough case for trial.
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What has been the impact of the Miranda deci-
sion on police effectiveness? A review of the various
studies dealing with the topic indicates that the
impact of Miranda has been slight. In the im-
mediate study it was found that even though the
officers conceived interrogation to be essential in
solving most crimes, it was actually necessary in
only about one quarter of the cases surveyed.
Furthermore, an analysis of 478 cases by the
author produced very little indication that the
Miranda requirements had materially affected
the outcome of formal police interrogation, or any
other factors such as the recovery of stolen
property. Even though there had been a decline
in both the conviction and clearance rates of the
Seaside City Police Department, for the reasons
set forth in this study one would be hard pressed to
attribute those declines specifically to Miranda.
Interrogation performs many collateral func-
tions for the police. It is here that the impact of
Miranda was more distinct. The police were found
to be implicating fewer accomplices, clearing
fewer crimes and recovering less property through
interrogation, and helping fewer suspects clear
themselves. Therefore, the writer concludes that
the impact of Miranda on law enforcement in the
jurisdiction studied was slight. This substantiates
the findings of related studies. The results do not
support the thesis that police interrogation is
unnecessary.
In order to balance the scale upon which rest
the rights of the individual and the interests of
society, the proponents in each camp will have to
realize that they are playing a game of give-and-
take. Those championing the rights of the in-
dividual must be ready to sacrifice some individual
rights and liberties in order to foster a type of
society in which all can enjoy a certain measure
of rights. On the other hand, those championing
the cause of society must understand that police
efficiency has to yield on occasions to the rights
and liberties of the individual.
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